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MAKING THE ACCUSED TESTIFY AGAINST
HIMSELF
ERNEST BRUNCKEN,

Member of the Milwaukee Bar.

Among the changes which a committee of the Wisconsin State
Bar Association recently proposed for recommendation to the
Legislature was an amendment to Section 8, Art. I, of the State
Constitution, inserting therein, after the words "jeopardy of
punishment, nor" the clause: "until the Legislature shall otherwise
provide," the effect being that the Legislature may at any time
and to any extent take away the privilege of "not being compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." The report
was rejected by the members of the Bar Association present, but
it is reasonably certain that efforts for such a change will continue.
The arguments in favor of the proposed change are mainly
drawn from two practical inconveniences of the law as it stands.
It is argued that the privilege results in the escape of the persons
really guilty, where, in a number of offenses committed by juridical
persons, or by several persons jointly, the proof is difficult without
the testimony of individuals accessory to the act, and these persons
promptly plead the benefits of the various immunity acts.' The
other reason is that under present conditions the legal impossibility
of examining the accused, unless he consents, results in improper
and often scandalous attempts on the part of police officers and
other unauthorized individuals to extort confessions, sometimes
by physical or mental cruelty.
The successful opposition, at the meeting of the State Bar Association, seems to have been inspired more by conservative feeling
and a reluctance to curtail in any manner the rights of individuals
as laid down in our historic bills of rights, than in a thoroughly
reasoned attitude. It may as well be admitted that the privilege
is hard to defend by arguments purely rationalistic and taking the
law as if it were an independent and isolated rule having no connection with the rest of our legal system. It is true that the natural way of finding out whether a person has committed a certain
act is to ask him about it, and if he denies, to make him explain
any circumstances pointing to him as the person who did it. It
'These acts and provisions, in Wisconsin, are: Wisconsin Statutes 179Im1,
4534, 19550, 4o78d, 4575n, 4078a, 4078b, 4077 and possibly a few others.
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is also true that the rule sprang up during the time when political
persecution frequently took the form of criminal prosecution,
during the struggle against Stuart absolutism; and that it was
elaborated while the recollection of that struggle was still fresh.
It may be said-a few years ago it was easier to maintain this
argument than it is just now-that the necessity of guarding
against governmental ferocity has ceased, and that the rule is now
simply a convenient loophole for guilty parties to escape punishment. Formerly, when the accused could not testify at all, there
might have been cases of conviction by circumstantial evidence
which the defendant might easily have explained; but the law has
been changed in that respect, and besides, juries are notoriously
reluctant to convict on circumstantial evidence, unjustified as that
attitude of mind may be. That the really guilty persons in prosecutions against corporations are given to taking "immunity baths"
cannot be denied; and that the police, or even the district attorney
sometimes, resort to the "third degree" is certainly deplorable and
might not be done so often if it were possible to question the
2
suspect openly before a magistrate..
Nevertheless, I believe that there are very important grounds
on which the proposed constitutional amendment ought to be defeated. These are (i) That the form in which the constitutional
amendment is drawn is vague and inexpedient; (2) that the rule
cannot be excised from the body of our law without making other
changes necessary, many of which cannot be foreseen; (3) that
the inconveniences arising from the rule can be measurably abated
by less radical measures.
I
The proposed amendment leaves it to the Legislature whether
the rule is to remain, or whether it is to be modified, curtailed, or
entirely abolished. In effect, the Legislature is to decide whether
the Constitution is to be changed in this particular or not. No
doubt, the voters, with whom will lie the ultimate decision if the
amendment should twice pass through the Legislature, have a
perfect right to entrust the latter body with the power of changing
the fundamental law of the State, not only in this instance but
if the people choose in every instance. This would seem, however,
a startling retrogression from what we have heretofore considered
a fundamental principle of American policy, namely that the whole
'See Wigmore on Evidence, Chap. LXXVIII, for a full account of the
history and the ordinary reasons against the rule.
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people, represented by the electors, have alone the power of determining the frame of government. It would be a long backward
step towards the English principle of Parliamentary omnipotence,
a step proposed at the very moment when the general tendency of
our political development is to take some of the legislative functions away from elective bodies and give them to the electorate
itself.
The case is not analogous to those instances where the Constitution expressly empowers the Legislature to frame exceptions
to a general constitutional rule; as where the Constitution provides
for certain courts, but lets the Legislature "establish inferior
courts in the several counties, with limited civil and criminal
jurisdiction." There the general rule is fixed by the people, but
recognizing that there may be special circumstances requiring a
different or additional court, they permit the Legislature to attend
to that detail. The present amendment proposes to leave it to the
Legislature to determine, not a mere subordinate detail, but
whether one of the fundamental rules of jurisprudence, long established, and heretofore considered important enough to be embodied in the Constitution itself, shall remain or not. Certainly
an extraordinary proposition.
The probable reasons why the framers of the proposed amendment drew it as they did are not hard to find. The rule, although
expressed in few words, is not as simple as it looks. In fact a
considerable body of case law has grown around it. One who
should read the constitutional provision by itself and not look at
the interpretations given to it in a long series of successive precedents would hardly conclude that the privilege may be claimed
not only by the accused in the particular case on trial, but also
by mere witnesses; not only with regard to the issue then at the
bar, but with respect to any matter that might possibly become
the subject of a subsequent criminal action; and strangest of all,
even in a civil action, although the Constitution expressly says: "in
any criminal case." Now the objects the proponents have mainly
in view-the prevention of immunity claims by corporate agents,
and of temptation to extort confessions--do not necessarily require the entire abolition of the rule. Any number of limitations,
especially of those interpretative rules laid down by the courts,
may be imagined which would accomplish that purpose and leave
much of the general rule intact; but to select one of these and set
it out in the Constitution would be inconvenient. It might not be
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possible to do it in less space than several sections. The length,
and the incomprehensibility of such an amendment to the average
voter, would probably doom it to defeat. So, in order to avoid
this danger the proponents are willing to tamper with one of the
most important principles of American constitutional practice.
Surely a bad case of expediency before principle!
II
The proponents of the amendment are aware, of course, how
great the difference is between that which a mere reading of the
text of the constitutional provision conveys to the mind, and the
large body of complicated rules regarding self-crimination which
make up the real law on the subject. Yet they seem to have no
scruples about precipitating one or more statutory rocks into the
sea of law, on which new crops of sea weed may gather. They
are quite willing to unsettle a matter which in the course of time
has become fairly certain, by statutes which must necessarily become the starting points of new developments of legal doctrine, the
end of which no man can foresee. It would seem that many
American lawyers have no realization of the difficulties inherent
in statutory alterations of legal principles under our system. The
flood of statutes biennially ground out by our Legislatures is so
enormous that the feeling seems to prevail: Go ahead, one more
or less will make no difference. The fact, however, is that by far
the greater portion of the acts found in each successive volume of
session laws do not affect legal principles at all. They are mere
regulations of detail, administrative rules, often nothing but orders
that some single thing be done. They are concerned with matters
which, in countries working under the parliamentary system, are
attended to by the Ministries or Departments. They should, of
course, be drawn and considered carefully; but if a poorly drawn
or ill advised statute of this class is adopted, the mischief is easily
noticed and remedied. It remains on the outside of the body
politic, so to speak, does not change its internal character, and is,
if need be, easily lopped off again by repeal.
A statutory change of one of the principles of private or criminal law is a more serious matter. It is seldom limited in its effects
to the particular subject with which primarily it deals. It may
be likened to the food taken into the human body, which is indeed
first of all deposited in the digestive organs, but may finally become
the material of tissue-building in any part of the anatomy, and
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no person can foresee where it will finally show its effects. Thus
the statute may in words refer to a definite and circumscribed
subject; but from the moment it goes into effect it no longer
stands by itself but becomes an integral part of the entire legal
organism, and every part of the latter must be brought into harmony with it. Until that process is completed, uncertainty must
prevail as to what the law is, affording countless opportunities
for more rash reformers making the malady worse by still more
statutes.
The normal way for legal principles to change is by the cautious
building up of precedents. The principle of "stare decisis" may
or may not be the ideal way of adapting the law of a community
to its needs, but it is our way. There is not the slightest prospect
of our abandoning it for the methods of Continental Europe, or
any other system. Moreover, great as have been the statutory
changes during the last hundred years, the core of American law
is still customary, still the old Common Law brought from England. Every statute is nothing but an amendment of the Common Law, the principles of which immediately run through the
veins of the new act so that it is henceforth organically connected
with every immemorial custom. This fundamentally customary
character of our law, and the principle of "stare decisis," historisally and logically inseparable from the former, make the statutory change of a legal principle a far more difficult undertaking
than in countries where the Roman methods of interpretation
prevail. If American courts were at liberty to disregard prior decisions; if it were the duty of every judge, as it is in France
and Germany, to be guided by nothing, in construing the text
of a written law, except his own trained understanding of the
words, the privilege of refusing to incriminate one's self would
never have been extended to mere witnesses, nor to civil cases,
when the text expressly limits it to criminal ones. Under the rule
of precedent, every new decision becomes a new starting point of
interpretative reasoning. What lies behind the last wellestablished precedent is settled law; the court accepts it as it finds
it; while the Continental judge is expected to go back to the bare
text in every case calling for its application. The first case may
go beyond the actual "intention of the legislator" by ever so little,
the least deviation is enough for being the beginning of the development in a direction never dreamt of by the originators of the
text. This, I have no doubt, happened in the rule against self-
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crinination. Personally, I believe that the individual who first
formulated the text as a part of an American Constitution, never
meant to do more than prohibit the questioning of the accused regarding the facts of the offense for which he was then being
prosecuted. In other words, he wished to prohibit the introduction
of the inquisitorial process in criminal cases. That was a rather
lively subject of debate in France, at the time of the American
Revolution, and continued to be so, throughout Continental Europe, till about the middle of the nineteenth century.3 So much
for the insertion of the clause in American bills of rights. All
extensions of the rule are subsequent legal growth; they may have
been within the intention of the legislator in juridical contemplation, but certainly not in his actual consciousness.
Now let us assume that the amendment is adopted and the
Legislature passes some statute under it. We cannot foresee
what the scope of the statute may be. Perhaps it will be nothing
more than authority given for a sort of discovery proceeding
against corporations without consequent immunity of the testifying
officers. Perhaps it may, in broad terms, take away the privilege
altogether. Whatever its text and apparent purpose, it will become
the starting point for a vigorous growth of new law by adjudication, and there is no possibility of telling whether or not, after
fifty years, the result may not be as surprising as the present
scope of the rule would be to the authors of the clause in the
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which
is practically identical with the Wisconsin rule. One can easily
imagine that zealous district attorneys, with the help of complacent
magistrates, may use such a statute to convert our criminal procedure into a very fair imitation of a seventeenth century criminal
trial in France, with the grosser forms of physical torture supplanted by refined mental anguish, but relieved of the humane
restriction that a prima facie case must be made against the
accused before he is stretched on the rack. All that would be
necessary is to have an indefinite series of continuances of the
preliminary hearing before the magistrate, to give the district
attorney a chance to verify each of the statements of the defendant.
No doubt he would discover that some of the collateral facts were
different from what the accused represented them to be. Then
the poor devil, whether guilty or innocent, could be threatened
'Comp. Francis Lieber, Civil Liberty and Self-Government, Chap. VII.
Also: id., Appendix IIL
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with prosecution for perjury. At once he would try to correct
his previous testimony, get himself completely tangled in contradictions, and, if on the subsequent trial he had cleared his mind
and told a straight story, he would be confronted with his altogether different testimony in the preliminary hearing, until every
juror would be ready to call him the most brazon liar that ever
lived.
Such a proceeding would be the essence of the inquisitorial
process in its unadulterated form, except that there is a final
jury trial added. The present method on the Continent also has
the final jury trial; but in a trial such as we might have under the
amendment, the situation would be much worse for the accused
than before a European court. True, he would be examined by
the district attorney and not by the court itself; he might even
find occasional protection against too atrocious bullying from
the supposedly impartial gentleman on the bench. Yet, in the
French or German court, he would be allowed to tell his own story,
while here he would be constantly stopped by objections that
what he says is "irrelevant," "hearsay," "not the best evidence,"
and so forth. Or do the proponents expect that together with the
statute permitting the questioning of the accused the Legislature
will also undertake a radical reform of the law of evidence? The
modern principle on the Continent is that the partieg may submit
whatever evidence they deem, in good faith, calculated to help
their case. It is for the court afterwards to reject what is improper. Especially is there no arbitrary rule excluding hearsay.
Obviously, this works to the advantage of the accused, especially
in showing the bias or malice of adverse witnesses.
III
All of this, and much more that niight be said, shows how
single change, such as is here proposed, may not only be much
greater in its consequences than the proponents can foresee or
desire, but also that the change of one principle requires changes
in others, unless our whole system is to be thrown into confusion.
That does not mean, of course, that statutory changes of legal
principles are to be avoided under all circumstances. Sometimes,
a time-honored principle is no longer in accord with changed
economic or social conditions, and yet it is so entrenched in precedents, that there is no prospect of reform by judicial adjudication. Then the surgical operation of statutory change may
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properly be resorted to. Such was the case with the distribution
of personal risk growing nut of modem industrial life. There
the change from the principle of negligence as basis of liability,
to the recognition of the social character of industrial employment
was demanded by every consideration of logic, good policy and
humanity, but it could not be effected except by legislation. In
the present case we are asked to favor a fundamental change in
criminal procedure on no better ground than the convenience of
prosecuting officers. We are told that district attorneys and
police authorities sometimes have trouble in securing sufficient
evidence, although we see that criminals are duly convicted every
day. It is said that incompetent and brutal police officers are
exposed to the temptation of adopting illegal and sometimes inhuman methods of extorting confessions. The obvious answer
is: "Punish the perpetrators of 'third degree' crimes, and protect
their victims against revenge." While that is obvious and right as
far as it goes, a surer remedy will be found in the better organization of our police service. As matters are, most of the evils
complained of, both as regards failure to find evidence, and ill treatment of prisoners, comes from the smaller towns, where the police
authorities are untrained, poorly disciplined, and often mere petty
politicians, not always of the best character. In Milwaukee, it
is very doubtful whether the grosser form of this abuse, at least,
is fairly chargeable. It should be said, moreover, that there is
great need for systematic training of police officials in methods of
detecting crime, such as have been elaborated in Europe. No
question that a few men in the Milwaukee police force, by long
experience and intelligent private effort, have acquired exceptional skill in their profession. That, however, can by no means
be said of the ordinary "fly-cop."
The case of the corporate officer committing statutory offenses
and promptly taking his immunity bath stands on a different basis.
The statutes here in question are attempts to regulate business
methods, perfectly permissible, in many cases, at, common law,
but conceived to be incompatible with the public welfare under
modern economic conditions. They are what I should like to
call "nominal" or "inchoate" law, that is, law which is in force
because it is on the statute books, but not "essential" law, meaning
law which is upheld by the practically unanimous consciousness
of the community.4 It may, in the course of time, develop into
'Comp. Bruncken, Some Neglected Factors in Law-making, 8 Political
Science Review, 222.
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"essential" law, when the moral consciousness of every good
citizen will condemn offences against them as it now condemns
larceny and murder. For the present, however, nobody at heart
believes that the men committing such offenses are criminals, much
as one may reprehend their conduct from a social or economic
point of view. Still less do they themselves have qualms of conscience about their acts, although they deem it unfortunate to be
caught in them. Trials of this kind are apt to be simply matches
of skill between rival attorneys. When such statutes shall have,
become "essential" law, it will be no harder to convict the occasional offender than it is to convict a robber. For the present,
what we should learn from them is that it is as bad policy to try
the immediate transformation of society by penal statutes, as it is
to attempt making men temperate by the same means. Under no
condition, however, should we tamper with settled principles of
our Constitution to gain small and temporary ends. That also
would teach men to be "anarchists," that is contemners of all law
as a trifling thing.

